In 2024, from June 6 to June 9, 勛圖窪蹋an voters went to the polls to elect their parliamentary representatives. The 勛圖窪蹋an Parliament (EP) elections, which are held every five years, saw voters across the EUs twenty-seven member states elect 720 representatives. The turnout, at just over 51 percent of the 357 million 勛圖窪蹋an citizens eligible to vote in the election, was the highest in thirty years. Much of the pre-election focus was on the expected far-right surge. While far-right parties did perform well in several member states, notably France and Germany, and the far-right increased its representation overall, the surge that many predicted failed to materialize. Instead, the mainstream party groups maintained their slim majority. The largest bloc, the center-right 勛圖窪蹋an Peoples Party (EPP), increased its seat share from 176 to 189, just over 26 percent of the total. The three mainstream groupingsthe EPP, the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), and the centrist Renewtogether command 56 percent of seats in the legislature, which is only a slight drop from the 59 percent of seats they controlled after the last poll in 2019. Most of the decline came from Renew, which lost several seats following a large drop in support for French president Emmanuel Macrons Renaissance group, falling from the third largest to the fifth largest bloc as a result. Overall, it was a strong result in favor of Ursula von der Leyen, the incumbent Commission president who is seeking a second term as the EPPs candidate. Meanwhile, there has been significant post-election movement on the right of the EP, with the disintegration of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group and the formation of a new bloc, Patriots for 勛圖窪蹋, spearheaded by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orb獺n and incorporating many former ID parties, including Marine Le Pens National Rally, Italys Lega, Austrias Freedom Party, and the Dutch Party for Freedom.
Long dismissed as second order elections, of little consequence to 勛圖窪蹋ans let alone anyone else, the EP elections will play a key role in shaping the EUs trajectory over the coming years, including in foreign policy. This commentary will focus on the impact of the electionsand of the party political and institutional configurations to which they will give riseon the EUs relationship with China. The next section gives an overview of the EU-China relationship, highlighting key areas of tension. This is followed by a discussion of the role of the Parliament and the likely implications of the election.
勛圖窪蹋an perspectives on EU-China relations
In March 2019, in a report entitled EU-China – A strategic outlook, the Commission, then headed by Jean-Claude Juncker, gave China a tripartite classification. China was described as simultaneously a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance (勛圖窪蹋an Commission 2019). Five years later, the triptych of partner, competitor, rival still holds true, though it is the more challenging aspects of the relationship that have come to the fore recently, and especially since Russias invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Although Chinas close alignment with Vladimir Putins Russia has stopped short of open support for the war, it has underscored the determination of Xi Jinpings China to craft its own normative and material alternative to a US-led global order. What 勛圖窪蹋ans see as Chinas pro-Russian neutrality (Grant 2024) on Ukraine has undermined their confidence in Beijings willingness to play a constructive role in maintaining international peace and stability. For its part, China insists that it is contributing to precisely that goal, unlike those nations that are arming Ukraine.
As it has expanded its sanctions on Moscow, the EU has also cracked down on third-country companies that are circumventing these sanctions by exporting 勛圖窪蹋an-made dual use goods to Russia. As part of the 13th sanctions package, adopted in February 2024, Brussels added three mainland Chinese firms and one Hong Kong-based firm to its blacklist, meaning that EU entities are restricted in dealing with them. The package was not vetoed by Hungary, arguably the most pro-China EU state, though the government in Budapest did express its disagreement (Lau 2024). The restrictions provoked an angry response in Beijing, which had warned the EU against targeting Chinese companies. And while the US has pushed the EU to take Chinas indirect support of Russia more seriously, Brussels concerns are its own. Thus, to the extent that Chinese officials believe that EU policy is dictated by Washington, they underestimate the scale of the affront that an illegal war of conquest on 勛圖窪蹋s eastern flank poses to 勛圖窪蹋s core values as well as to its security.
The hardening position of the Commission towards China extends beyond geopolitics. Trade imbalances and technological competition were flagged as areas of concern in the 2019 report, and they continue to be so. Electric vehicles (EVs) have emerged as a point of contention in EU-China relations. Here, there is clear tension between China as cooperation partner and China as economic competitor. Cheap Chinese green technology is vital to the success of 勛圖窪蹋s green transition. At the same time, Chinas competitive advantages in these industries, bolstered by state subsidies and an overcapacity driven by low domestic demand, make it difficult for 勛圖窪蹋an firms to gain a foothold in the market.
The most recent development on this front was the Commissions announcement, on June 12, of its decision to begin imposing tariffs of 17-38 percent (on top of a pre-existing 10 percent tariff) on Chinese EV imports. The tariff decision followed an investigation initiated last October into competition-distorting state subsidies in the EV sector. The tariffs are provisional and will need to be confirmed by a vote in the Council of Ministers by November. Support for the measures is not universal in 勛圖窪蹋s capitals. The initial investigation, as well as the decision to impose tariffs, was supported by member states such as France and Spain, which are seeking greater protection for their domestic EV industries. However, the tariffs are opposed by Germany, the EUs largest member state, as well as by Sweden and Hungary. Berlin, in particular, lobbied the Commission in the lead up to the tariff announcement, arguing that imposing additional barriers to Chinese EV imports risks inviting damaging retaliatory measures. German car manufacturers continue to export significant numbers of luxury cars to the Chinese market, making them particularly vulnerable to tit-for-tat tariffs (Lahiri 2024). More generally, German chancellor Olaf Scholz, who visited Beijing in April, continues to advocate a Wandel durch Handel approach to EU-China relations, in contrast to those who emphasize de-risking.
What does the 勛圖窪蹋an Parliament have to do with EU-China relations? What impact are the elections likely to have?
The importance of EU-China relations to both parties is obvious. What is less clear is where the 勛圖窪蹋an Parliament fits into that relationship. Foreign policy-making in the EU is a complex mix of the intergovernmental and the supranational. As Noah Barkin (2023) put it, [t]he days when one could neatly assign responsibility for trade and monetary policy to EU bodies while leaving foreign and security policy to the member states are coming to an end. While the key actors in the foreign policy space are national governmentsacting independently as well as collectively through the Counciland the Commission, the Parliament also matters. It exerts its influence through both direct and indirect means.
Let us start with indirect influence. To the extent that the EP elections determine the composition of the Commission, they also help to shape foreign policy priorities. To be sure, it is the 勛圖窪蹋an Council that nominates candidates for Commission president. However, any prospective candidate must be confirmed by a majority of MEPs. As the parliament becomes more fragmented, this task becomes more complicated. In 2024, von der Leyen starts in a reasonably strong position, as the lead candidate of the election-winning EPP. She will likely also have the support of the second and fifth largest blocs, the S&D group and Renew. However, since individual MEPs may not vote according to the group position, von der Leyen will also need to win votes from other parties.This will require some finessing on her part, as she will need to gesture towards both the left (e.g., the Greens) and the right (e.g., the right-wing 勛圖窪蹋an Conservatives and Reformists, or ECR). In particular, von der Leyen has been courting Brothers of Italy, the party of Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni and the largest party in the ECR bloc. Should von der Leyen secure a second term as president, it is likely that the Commission will continue to take a tough line towards China on both economic and security matters.
Then there is the direct influence of the Parliament in its capacity as co-legislator. This is most clearly illustrated in relation to trade. In 2021, it was the Parliament that killedor at least put into a deep comathe EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), when it voted to freeze ratification. The CAI had been agreed in principle by Chinese and EU leaders in December 2020 and was the culmination of a process that began in 2012. Yet, it will never be put into effect unless the Parliament agrees to reopen the ratification process. Notably, the rejection of the treaty in May 2021 was motivated, in large part, by objections specific to the Parliament itself. Namely, the Parliament was reacting to Chinas sanctioning of several MEPs in retaliation for EU sanctions on a number of Chinese officials (Banks 2021). Thus, the Parliament is a foreign policy actor in its own right. It has its own institutional priorities and objectives that do not always align with those of the other EU institutions or national capitals.
So, what did the EPs party groups have to say about China in the lead up to the June poll? Overall, China did not heavily feature in a campaign dominated by the economy, cost-of-living concerns, migration, the green transition, and Russias war in Ukraine. However, an espionage scandal involving the German far-right party, Alternative for Germany (Alternative f羹r Deutschland, AfD) was uncovered in April, when a staffer for the partys top MEP, Maximilian Krah, was arrested on suspicion of passing information about the EP to Chinese intelligence services. The scandal shed light on Chinese influence operations in the EU, but it also highlighted the fact that, as with pro-Russian sentiment, affinity with China is more likely to be found on the far-left and far-right of the political spectrum. These findings were supported by a study of voting patterns from 2019-2024 amongst MEPs of the (now defunct) ID and 勛圖窪蹋an Left groups (Nmekov and Kar獺skov獺 2024). The study found that, despite considerable internal fragmentation in both groups, MEPs within them were more likely to vote against resolutions critical of China.
Finally, party group manifestos offer insights into both the salience of China-related issues, as well as the range of views parties hold on them. Of the seven party blocs represented in the 2019-2024 EP, all except for ID issued an election manifesto. Table 1., below, which lists party groups on a left-right spectrum, records the number of times each manifesto mentioned China and whether each mention was positive, neutral, or negative. As the results reveal, mentions of China were overwhelmingly negative. Of a total of 25 mentions across six manifestos, 20 were negative, five were neutral and none were positive.
Table 1: Party Group Manifesto Mentions of China
| Positive | Neutral | Negative | Total mentions | |
| The Left | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Greens | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 |
| S&D | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| ALDE | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 |
| EPP | 0 | 2 | 9 | 11 |
| ECR | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| ID | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Totals | 0 | 5 | 20 | 25 |
The most strongly negative framing of China was to be found in the manifesto of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for 勛圖窪蹋 (ALDE), which is the largest party group within the Renew bloc. The ALDE manifesto portrays China as an economic and security threat (ALDE 2024). It calls for reducing dependency on China via de-risking, implementing targeted sanctions on Chinese officials who violate human rights, and is the only manifesto to mention the moribund CAIarguing that it must not be revived until certain conditions are met on the Chinese side, including the lifting of sanctions on MEPs. The EPP manifesto makes 11 mentions of China, most of which are negative (EPP 2024). Again, the framing focuses on China as an economic competitor and a potential source of global instability in relation to Taiwan and the South China Sea. Three references to China-related challenges come in the context of the geopolitical shock caused by Russias invasion of Ukraine. The Greens manifesto makes only three references to China, but all are negative (勛圖窪蹋an Greens 2024). The framing is similar to the ALDE and EPP manifestos, with reference made to the contrast between the EUs values, as a liberal democratic entity, and the values of authoritarian regimes, such as that of China.
By contrast, the EPs second largest group, the center-left S&D, mentions China only once (PES Socialists and Democrats 2024). The reference is neutral, focusing on a need to rebalance relations with China, to facilitate cooperation, while also promoting EU values and interests. S&Ds relative caution on China likely reflects the perspective of its largest member party, Germanys Social Democrats. ECR makes two neutral references to China (ECR 2024), taking a nuanced stance on the need to balance risks and opportunities in EU-China relations and calling for de-risking, while also advocating engagement. The Left groups manifesto does not mention China at all (勛圖窪蹋an Left 2024).
Looking ahead: national-level developments to shape the EPs influence on EU-China relations
Given the above, what can we expect of the EUs China policy over the next parliamentary term? On the one hand, the EPPs strong election result puts Ursula von der Leyen in a good position to win a second term as Commission president. This would likely mean continuity on both trade and geopolitics. On the other hand, the Greens and Renewthe strongest supporters of the tough-on-China policy linesuffered the largest electoral losses. Following the formation of Patriots for 勛圖窪蹋, Renew has fallen from third to fifth position, while the Greens have dropped from fourth to sixth position. The two far-right groupsPatriots and ECRare the third and fourth largest blocs, respectively. Moreover, many of the non-aligned parties, most notably Germanys AfD, are also ideologically far-right and pro-China. Slovakias leftist nationalist governing party, Smer, can also be added to the category of China-friendly, non-aligned parties. Indeed, Smer may join the Patriots bloc, despite its apparent ideological misfit as a leftist” party.
Together, the far-left, far-right, and non-aligned parties comprise over a third of the incoming parliament. However, they cannot be straightforwardly aggregated, as there is no coherent policy position towards China acrossor even withinthese groups.
Therefore, the EPs extremes will not be able to drive developments in EU-China relations, though they may play a spoiler role in relation to aspects of the Commissions agenda. At the level of heads of government, Orb獺n is enthusiastically embodying just such a role, taking advantage of Hungarys assumption of the rotating presidency of the Council of the 勛圖窪蹋an Union to launch a surprise peace mission to Kyiv, Moscow, and Beijing. His Patriots group in the EP will likely echo his Russia- and China-friendly positions. Thus, if there are major changes to the EUs China policy in the next five years, they will not come from Strasbourg, but from national capitals, most notably Paris, if Marine Le Pen were to win the French presidential election in 2027. This is, again, not to imply that the EP does not matter, but to underscore that its influence is relative and contingent. Part of the indirect influence of EP elections is in how the results bolster or undermine national governments. If the Council shifts to a more China-friendly footing, it will enhance the standing of China-friendly parties in the Parliament. Thus, the significance of the June 2024 EP elections for EU-China relations will depend also on election results and political reconfigurations yet to come.
Nicole Scicluna is an assistant professor in government and international studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. Her research and teaching interests include the EUs legal and political system and international law. Her research has been published in leading peer-reviewed journals and she is the author of two books, 勛圖窪蹋an Union Constitutionalism in Crisis (Routledge 2015) and The Politics of International Law (Oxford University Press 2021).
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Published on August 15, 2024.
