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Arguably, the current war in Ukraine has already been going on since 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea. This war has had far-reaching consequences, producing a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, a strained relationship between Russia and the West, and political friction in �ԹϺ���. NATO and the Russian War in Ukraine: Strategic Integration and Military Interoperability addresses the intensification in strategic and military integration in �ԹϺ���—and specifically NATO’s role in this trend—as a response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. On the first page, the editors write that this book is the first account of “the challenges and the solutions for so-called multi-domain and strategic integration in the defence sector in �ԹϺ���.” Their aim is to outline how NATO has become the “hub” for such integration and how Russia’s war has impacted—and will impact—the Alliance’s structure. By discussing these questions thematically and through national cases, they intend to clarify how interoperability and strategic integration are conceived, debated, problematized, and resolved.

The book consists of ten chapters, divided into three parts—each providing a comprehensive and nuanced picture of the subject matter at hand. Part one highlights current thinking in major NATO states on the impact of multi-domain integration for NATO. For example, Rob Johnson highlights NATO’s template for multi-domain operations (MDO) as well as for the even more complex Alliance-wide multi-domain integration (MDI), an integration of both non-military and military instruments into one single strategy. Also covered is NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept and maritime-strategic integration and operability. The second part of the book focuses on the possible strategic implications of the Russian war for �ԹϺ���, with an emphasis on the war’s impact on the international system and central players such as Russia, the US, and China, as illustrated by Kori Schaki’s analysis of the staggering threat posed to the international system by China and Russia since the start of Russia’s war. In her analysis, she also observes that “Taiwan is not Ukraine,” thus insisting that Chinese-Taiwanese relations are quite different from the relations between Russia and Ukraine. After all, Taiwan has no strategic depth to fall back on, and China has never been an imperial suppressor of Taiwan. The third and last part of the book shows the impact of the war on enhanced military integration. The most interesting chapters are on Germany (Zeitenwende), Finland and its turn to the Alliance (the editors’ deadline for this publication made it apparently impossible to reflect on Sweden’s membership in NATO), and the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. The book reveals that a division of labor has come into existence between the originally US-led Contact Group, which assists Ukraine with lethal weapons deliveries, and NATO, which deters Russia from using nuclear weapons. This is not to say that no friction exists among NATO members about the provision of weapons to Ukraine. Paradoxically, risk-averse Germany has slowly but gradually become a cornerstone of weapon support to Ukraine, although it remains doubtful whether Germany—and continental �ԹϺ��� in general for that matter—would have ever considered sending lethal weapons to Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the impact of the war in Ukraine on the EU’s defense reforms remains largely underexposed in the book. Andrew Michta, in his chapter, quite rightly posits that national defense is the last bastion of sovereignty for EU member states; therefore, a common defense policy remains an Achilles’ heel for the EU. In the book, Beatrice Heuser briefly outlines some of the EU’s defense initiatives arising from its main document in this policy field, the Strategic Compass (2022). Overall, however, the EU’s “grand strategy” is to intervene through non-military means, i.e., through the enforcement of economic sanctions against Russia and entry bans for Russia’s political and military leadership. In short, to paraphrase Heuser, if the EU does not get its act together, it is at risk of being turned from a welfare paradise into a paradise of fools.

One key aspect of NATO’s defense integration is a “golden oldie” in NATO’s history, viz. burden-sharing (renamed “burden transferring” by Michta): the distribution of defense responsibilities and resources among NATO members. This distribution has been a source of tension within the Alliance, as some members, particularly the US, have shouldered a disproportionate share of the burden, leading the US to call for other members to increase their defense spending and contributions to the Alliance. It is painful to note that a war in �ԹϺ��� was needed to convince a majority of �ԹϺ���an NATO allies to live up to the commonly agreed norm of spending two percent of GDP on defense.

The second aspect of defense integration the book addresses concerns the interoperability of military forces, which refers to the ability of different countries’ militaries to work together effectively and seamlessly to achieve common objectives. This collaboration requires not only joint training and exercises but standardized equipment and communication systems as well. The book’s editors are quite right to recall that a plethora of �ԹϺ���an regional defense coalitions already exist, such as the French-British Lancaster House Agreement (2010) and the 2009 Nordic Defence Cooperation (which includes Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden). Although these coalitions are potentially cost-effective, it is argued that much more needs to be done to effect a true collaboration. Indeed, for NATO to become a real security community, “integration of [an] underlying strategic outlook” is needed. NATO is the “natural” hub for this integration to be realized, as the book shows in its explanation that NATO’s maritime and air forces are better developed than its land forces. However, a well-known exception to this rule is the integration of the Dutch and German armed forces, dating back to 1995 when a German-Netherlands Corps was established. Two years ago, this particular integration was completed when the last Dutch Brigade that remained under national command was finally placed under German command.

A third theme emerging from the book is the potential enlargement of NATO, with Ukraine’s joining. This theme, however, is disappointingly left as a minor issue in this collective volume. This neglect comes as a surprise because, in the words of one contributor, Ukraine is a “lynchpin state for Russian neo-imperial ambitions and thereby for �ԹϺ���an security.” The outcome of the Russian war will thus have severe implications for �ԹϺ���an security and transatlantic relations, as well as for NATO. To date, and unlike the consensus within the EU about Ukraine’s almost secured future as an EU member state, no consensus exists in NATO about Ukraine becoming part of the Alliance. Largely, northeastern �ԹϺ���an NATO members are in favor of such membership but the major Western �ԹϺ���an members are not. On this question, the US seems undecided at best, but it is highly unlikely that a membership invitation will be extended by NATO before the war has come to an end. The only “strategic logic” for NATO to follow may thus be to offer major arms supplies to Ukraine, as Janne Haaland Matlary argues in her chapter. The recent NATO summit in Washington DC on the occasion of the organization’s 75th anniversary has confirmed this logic. President Zelensky was given no concrete prospect of his country’s membership in NATO and returned home empty-handed.

Inevitably, the collective volume has some limitations. Since the deadline for the book was set for 2023, it does not cover some major recent issues in a substantial way. For example, the case of Ukraine’s potential membership in NATO is underdeveloped. Another drawback is the lack of diversity among the contributors, as the vast majority of the authors emanate from NATO member states. As a consequence, there is an absence of perspectives from NATO’s partner countries, underexposing some important insights. In addition, certain ideas and points are reiterated throughout the book, which can create a sense of redundancy. These repetitions could have been avoided with adequate editorial coordination between the various contributors.

When a number of authors contribute to a book, there is a risk that the outcome may not offer pleasant reading. However, this is fortunately not the case with this volume. The chapters are all worth reading in terms of content, style, and structure, although—almost inevitably—some contributors have a more fluid writing style than others. Generally, this book offers a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Russia’s war on the state of multi-domain and strategic integration within and outside NATO. It definitely is a valuable contribution to this field of study for academic researchers and politicians, as well as for students of international history and politics.

 

Abraham (“Bram”) Boxhoorn is currently Assistant Professor of International Relations and History at Webster University, Leiden Campus. His fields of specialization are the history of �ԹϺ���an international relations and transatlantic studies. His latest publication is a book he co-authored with Giles Scott-Smith, entitled The Transatlantic Era (1989–2020) in Documents and Speeches (Routledge, 2022).

 

 

By Janne Haaland Matlary and Rob Johnson (editors)
Publisher: Hurst
Hardcover / 227 pages / 2024
ISBN: 9781911723141

 

Published on August 15, 2024.