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With the dust still settling from the recent elections to the �ԹϺ���an Parliament (EP), this commentary assesses their implications for national and linguistic minority communities within the �ԹϺ���an Union (EU). What, for instance, will be the likely future shape of the EU Parliamentary Intergroup on Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages (IG9-23, hereafter “Intergroup”)—a diverse assortment of minority representatives from across the bloc (�ԹϺ���an Parliament, n.d.a), continuously in existence since 1983—and the agenda it has forged in connection with civil society? And, what will be the composition of the next �ԹϺ���an Commission (the focus for recent minority-rights activism within the EU), whose members are nominated by member state governments but approved by the EP? The Federal Union of �ԹϺ���an Nationalities (FUEN) previously sought to increase minority rights at the EU level through its Minority SafePack—an EU citizens’ initiative that was successful in collecting one million signatures but ultimately saw none of its proposals adopted by the EU Commission (�ԹϺ���an Citizens’ Initiative, n.d.). Ahead of the recent elections, FUEN released a manifesto containing a number of “requests” for ways the EU could strengthen minority rights, and it strongly encouraged voters to vote for candidates from their own minority communities (FUEN 2024a). This manifesto also included the same quote used by the Intergroup itself earlier in the year regarding the intention to “reestablish the Intergroup and continue its work” for the forthcoming parliamentary period of 2024-2029 (Intergroup for Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages 2024)—demonstrating the overlap between the Intergroup and FUEN.

Here, we first look at the broader political context, focusing on the narrative that the far-right has grown and looking at it in specific member states to understand the picture more holistically. We consider the newly created Patriots for �ԹϺ��� parliamentary grouping launched by Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán. We then introduce the Intergroup and its activities during the term of the outgoing EP, before reflecting upon the results of the 2024 election and their potential ramifications for the future iteration of the Intergroup and its activism around national and linguistic minorities.

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2024: lurch to the right or business as usual?

Much of the commentary and narrative following the elections has focused on the increased support they demonstrated for the far right, with particular attention given to the victory of the Rassemblement National (RN) in France (and the national legislative elections consequently called by President Emmanuel Macron), Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) second-place finish in Germany, and increased support for Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia and the extremist Vox party in Spain. Yet, while this ascendant far-right narrative is by no means false, the picture across the EU-28 is far more complex. In many countries, parties belonging to the center-right �ԹϺ���an People’s Party (EPP) held their ground relatively well and still constitute the largest grouping within the new parliament. The Socialists center-left grouping, meanwhile, remained stable, with the biggest losses being sustained by the Greens[1] and the Liberals (Niranjan and O’Carroll 2024).

This complexity is illustrated by the example of Spain, which has seen especially acrimonious debates around linguistic diversity and ethno-regional autonomy during the past decade. Here Vox gained two seats to move up to six—firmly consolidating itself as the third largest Spanish party within the EP—while the pro-Catalan independence party Junts lost two of its previous three seats. The governing center-left Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), however, lost only one seat and ended up with 20 in total (�ԹϺ���an Parliament, n.d.b; 2024), coming in second to the largest beneficiary, the main center-right opposition People’s Party (PP), which gained a further nine seats to secure 22 of the country’s 61 Member of the �ԹϺ���an Parliament (MEP) allocation. Moreover, another rightist nationalist grouping, the anti-Catalan Citizens party, lost all eight of its MEPs—unsurprising considering the party did not even contest the 2023 Spanish general election. It appears therefore that PP was the major beneficiary of this collapse, rather than Vox.

The growth of the far right in the EU, however, remains a cause for concern, as in certain states governance at national or regional levels by the parties concerned has already threatened the rights of national and linguistic minorities. Vox, for example, has posed significant opposition to the use of regional languages in Valencia and the Balearic Islands (Etxearte 2023). This is also true as regards efforts by Intergroup and civil society activists to secure fuller legislative guarantees for national and linguistic minority rights from the side of the �ԹϺ���an Commission, as witnessed by the staunch opposition expressed by MEPs from the RN, AfD, Vox, and the Citizens party during the 2020 �ԹϺ���an parliamentary debates on the EU Citizens’ Initiative for a Minority Safepack (MSPI) spearheaded by the Intergroup-affiliated Federal Union of National Minorities (Smith 2024). With the new EP landscape far more fragmented than before and political volatility within many member states, the composition of the incoming Commission also remains to be seen. In this regard, moreover, even if the incumbent coalition of EPP, center-left, and liberals endures[2] and many of the current commissioners are retained, it will not necessarily be good news as far as minority rights activists are concerned: in common with its predecessor, the 2019-2024 Commission showed consistent opposition to the MSPI, which it rejected in 2021 even though the initiative won solid support in the Parliament (Smith and Willis 2024).

One member state pivotal to ongoing debates on minority rights, meanwhile, is Hungary. Over the past four decades, successive Hungarian governments have consistently supported and engaged with the sizeable Hungarian kin-minority communities living in neighboring states, many representatives of which can be found within Intergroup and FUEN. Accordingly, Hungary has firmly advocated fuller international legal guarantees for national and linguistic minorities, providing substantial support to the MSPI during 2013-2021 and signaling that minority rights will be a key priority during its current 2024 EU presidency. Under the rule of Fidesz since 2010, however, the country has also found itself in conflict with the EU due to its enactment of an illiberal authoritarian regime (Kim 2023) and pro-Russia political stance, both of which have made Prime Minister Viktor Orbán a figurehead for elements of the global far right. This support of Russia and simultaneous attempts to block Ukraine’s closer links to the EU and NATO has an inherent link to national minorities, given Orbán’s stated concern about the treatment by Ukraine of its Hungarian minority in the country’s Zakarpattia region (Spike 2024).

Going into the EU election, Fidesz remained strong on the domestic level—seeing off a united opposition in 2022 and increasing its vote share compared to 2018 (Politico, n.d.). However, led by a previous Fidesz minister—Peter Magyar—a new party named Tisza gained almost 30 percent of the 2024 EU parliamentary vote, which saw Fidesz score below 50 percent in an election for the first time since 2010 (Jack 2024). The vote share of 44.6 percent was not the footing Orbán would have wanted going into the EU presidency. Orbán has however quickly announced plans for a new faction in the EU parliament, Patriots for �ԹϺ���, launched alongside far-right parties from Austria and Czechia and quickly joined by Chega of Portugal (Hernández-Morales 2024). The grouping received a significant boost when France’s RN announced it would join, with its young leading figure, Jordan Bardella, taking the role of president of the Patriots for �ԹϺ���, alongside Fidesz MEP (and Intergroup co-chair), Kinga Gál, as deputy (Rankin and Giuffrida 2024). Joined also by Spain’s Vox, Italy’s Lega and other far-right parties from the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark, the grouping finds itself with 84 MEPs and has passed the seven-country quota required for becoming a group (ibid.). This makes Patriots for �ԹϺ��� the third largest grouping after EPP and the Socialists, which means that it has essentially replaced the Identity and Democracy group (ID). The Patriots for �ԹϺ��� have stopped short of allowing Germany’s AfD to join, in line with ID’s previous decision to expel that party over an MEP’s comments sympathizing with Nazis (von Pezold et al. 2024).

The far right is not completely united, however. The �ԹϺ���an Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) led by Italy’s Fratelli d’Italia has remained separate, and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) has rejected Orbán’s approach, opting to stay in the ECR (Krzysztoszek 2024). This splintering appears to be driven in large part by the dividing line between the Hungarian government and the Polish government when it comes to stances towards Russia (Rankin 2022). The ECR—particularly the voice of Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni—offers a right-wing but anti-Putin option for PiS and possibly for other right-wing parties and MEPs. Indeed, Czech prime minister Petr Fiala—whose Civic Democratic Party is also an ECR member—did not mince his words with regard to the new group, suggesting that Patriots for �ԹϺ��� “serves the interests of Russia” and therefore “threatens the security and freedom of �ԹϺ���” (Rankin and Giuffrida 2024).[3] This dividing line could also come to the fore within the EP Intergroup or FUEN, given their previous condemnation of Vladimir Putin’s actions and their consequent support of Ukraine (FUEN 2022; 2024b).

 

The parliamentary Intergroup on Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages

The Intergroup has roots going back over 40 years but adopted its current name in the post-Lisbon era of 2009 (Gál et al. 2011).[4] In 2019-2024, it was chaired by three MEPs from different political groupings—François Alfonsi, a Corsican elected for the Régions et Peuples Solidaires party in France, Kinga Gál, a Fidesz MEP for Hungary,[5] and Loránt Vincze of the Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség (RMDSZ), who represented the Hungarians in Romania (�ԹϺ���an Parliament, n.d.a). These three individuals’ affiliations present an interesting array: while RMDSZ is known for its links to Fidesz, Vincze and Gál sat in different parliamentary groups—the former aligned with EPP and the latter as a non-attached MEP,[6] while Alfonsi was attached to the minority and regionalist-oriented (and Green-affiliated) EFA Furthermore, looking at the group’s broader membership of 30 MEPs, there were representatives from across the political spectrum, including multiple members of Lega in Italy—aligned with the right-wing ID group— and one member from La France Insoumise (LFI)—aligned with the Left Group (NGL), and everything in between. Geographically, the representatives encompassed 14 different member states of the EU from as far afield as Estonia and Finland in the north and Malta in the south. Prominent minority groups represented included Basques and Catalans, as well as Swedish in Finland, Hungarians in Romania, and Danish in Germany.

The Intergroup’s listed activities consisted mostly of meetings, both with members of the EU Parliament but also other �ԹϺ���an and national-level stakeholders. In terms of links to organizations representing national and linguistic minorities, there was an obvious close affiliation to FUEN, reflecting Loránt Vincze’s role in both entities. The Intergroup thus strongly supported the MSPI, while its agenda aligned with FUEN’s 2024 EU Elections Manifesto (FUEN 2024a), which called for the integration of the Council of �ԹϺ���’s basic minority protection standards into the EU acquis and for the creation of the �ԹϺ���an Forum of national and linguistic minorities to serve as an affiliated consultative advisory body for both the �ԹϺ���an Union and the Council of �ԹϺ���. Intergroup members declared that they received no financial assistance during the previous parliament.[7] However, given the number of meetings the Intergroup held concerning the Minority SafePack Initiative and its links through Vincze as FUEN president since 2016, it could have indirectly benefited from funding FUEN received—in particular the income listed as “MSPI / �ԹϺ���an Development,” which equated to around €500,000 a year (Smith and Willis 2024). FUEN, however, is not the only affiliated organization representing the national or linguistic minorities involved. The �ԹϺ���an Language Equality Network (ELEN) is also a prominent voice with decades-long links to the EU and the Parliament. Also prominent is the Network to Promote Linguistic Diversity (NPLD). Both networks have met with the Intergroup on multiple occasions during the 2019-2024 period.

While the Intergroup has not yet reformed, there are a few immediate remarks of relevance that can be made following the latest election results. In terms of the three co-chairs, Gál and Vincze were both re-elected, whereas Alfonsi did not stand for re-election. Thus, one initial challenge for the Intergroup will be the decision of who could act as a co-chair from the left or Green/EFA faction. Moreover, since Vincze remains in the EPP and has been elected as the group’s Coordinator of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) in the �ԹϺ���an Parliament (EPP Group, 2024), it remains to be seen whether he will choose to retain close links to Fidesz and Gál. Among the broader grouping, there will likely be some shifts due to the loss in support for Catalan independentists, as the Junts fell from having three MEPS to having only one (CatalanNews 2024), resulting in Intergroup member Antoni Comín i Oliveres losing his seat. In addition, Jordi Cañas, while not an independentist, was a member of the Intergroup, and he also lost his seat. With the bulk of the vote swing in Catalonia going to Spanish socialists, it remains to be seen whether any socialist MEPs join the intergroup as replacements for their Catalan counterparts. Many more across the Intergroup have kept their seats, however, so there will be substantial continuity. In the case of Spain, Diana Riba kept her seat for the Catalan Republican Left and thus remains as an EFA member. There are also new MEPs, such as the Basque Oihane Agirregoitia of the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV). Moreover, Herbert Dorfmann, a long-serving MEP from South Tyrol, was re-elected for the South Tyrol People’s Party, which sits in the EPP grouping (RAI News 2024). This party has a long history of cooperation with FUEN including through FUEN Vice-President Daniel Alfreider, who is also a prominent politician in the South Tyrol People’s Party at the regional level in Italy. Also re-elected was Rasmus Andresen, a Green MEP in Schleswig-Holstein (Schumacher 2024), who is himself part of the Danish minority in Germany and is thus probably the MEP closest to the faction of FUEN that is unhappy with FUEN’s links to Orbán. How will this tension play out across the next five years?

 

What to look out for in the next five years

Given the EU Parliament’s limited competences, as demonstrated in the MSPI campaign, its direct impact on national and linguistic minorities will likely remain limited. However, its relationship with domestic politics, particularly in the context of an emboldened far-right bloc, is where the Parliament could affect these minorities indirectly. The EU Commission is the EU body with more power to enact both the demands of the MSPI and FUEN’s subsequent calls for creating an advisory group on traditional national and linguistic minorities. Yet, the results of the EU elections seem unlikely to influence how the Commission will address these issues and even could be seen to be detrimental to the cause if FUEN continues to be linked (or perceived to be linked) to Fidesz. The Intergroup would be a central avenue through which minority rights advocates could hope to influence the Commission. However, it remains to be seen whether the Intergroup succeeds in maintaining the same level of cross-party involvement that it did during the 2019-2024 Parliament. If Kinga Gál is re-elected as one of the co-chairs of the Intergroup, alongside her new role as Deputy President of the Patriots for �ԹϺ���, it could alienate certain MEPs who are not from the far right and prevent them from joining or rejoining the Intergroup.

Given that the links to Orbán and Fidesz have already caused a rift within FUEN, the emergence of the new Patriots for �ԹϺ��� party will likely further amplify the concerns of those minority organizations that began to express their disquiet about these links already in 2022 (see Smith and Willis 2024). Since Fidesz will now have closer links in the EU Parliament to the far right—in France and Spain in particular—it could face renewed criticism within FUEN. Concerns have already been expressed in the context of the German minority in Denmark because the Patriots for �ԹϺ��� group has included the far-right Danish party (von Tiedemann, 2024). Moreover, Orbán has continued his appeasement approach with regard to Putin, in stark contrast to the statements FUEN previously made condemning Russia’s ongoing war and warning of its effects on minorities in Ukraine. The vast amount of funding FUEN receives from the Hungarian government—through the Bethlen Gábor Fund—is likely to be scrutinized again. Yet, as we previously discussed (Smith and Willis 2024), FUEN will have a leadership contest in 2025 and will elect a new president, as Loránt Vincze is coming to the end of his third and final term. The links between FUEN and the Hungarian government appear set to become a factor in this leadership election, although the issue will perhaps become less salient for FUEN if its new president comes from a different (i.e., Orbán-sceptic) faction. However, the knock-on effects of such an appointment could also spell the end of the sizable funding FUEN receives from the Bethlen Gabor Fund and in turn weaken the links between FUEN and the Intergroup—links that Vincze has generated through his leadership roles in both organizations.

More broadly, the strength of the far right is of direct concern to national and linguistic minorities but mostly at the domestic level, as this is where the competences on these issues mostly remain. For instance, where Vox has been in power in regional governments, it has acted against the Catalan language, and Vox’s links to Orbán in the EU Parliament will likely heighten its salience on the EU level and further embolden it domestically. This scenario certainly reinforces the argument that the EU Commission should act to strengthen national and linguistic rights at the EU level to combat the far-right’s actions at the domestic level.

 

 

Craig Willis��is a researcher at the �ԹϺ���an Centre for Minority Issues and a PhD candidate at the Europa-Universität Flensburg. His main research interests are that of national and linguistic minorities, in particular through minority language media but also in pan-�ԹϺ���an activism.

 

David Smith��is the Alec Nove Professor of East �ԹϺ���an Studies at the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Glasgow. He has published extensively on issues of nationalism, ethnic politics, and minority activism,��including Ethnic Diversity and the Nation State��(Routledge 2012, with John Hiden).

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[1] Under one grouping of “Greens/�ԹϺ���an Free Alliance (EFA),” which is of particular relevance in the context of minorities as the EFA side features many regionalist parties.

[2] At the time of writing, Ursula von der Leyen has commanded enough votes from this coalition to be re-elected as President of the new �ԹϺ���an Commission.

[3] Although the centrist pro-EU majority has pledged to maintain a “cordon sanitaire” that would prevent far-right representatives from obtaining key positions within the EP, this has been only selectively applied in practice. With two ECR MEPs already having been elected as vice-presidents of the Parliament at the time of writing, Patriots for �ԹϺ��� may now be set to become the sole pariah group.

[4] See Gál et al., 2011 for a full overview of the history of the intergroup since 1983.

[5] Gál is originally from the Hungarian community in Romania and had previously served as an advisor to RMDSZ.

[6] Following Fidesz’ suspension from the EPP in 2019 and subsequent decision to quit the grouping before being expelled.

[7] In the four years publicly provided, 2021-2024.

 

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�ԹϺ���an Parliament. n.d. a. MEPs �ԹϺ���an Parliament – Intergroup on Traditional Minorities, National Communities and Languages. .

�ԹϺ���an Parliament. n.d.b. Live Results by Country – Spain.

Etxearte, Odei. 2023 “What if PP and Vox govern together in Madrid? This is the dark program they could implement”. VilaWeb, 18 July. .

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Published on August 15, 2024.