The global turn in historiography has presented an opportunity to challenge the Eurocentric biases of scholars of 勛圖窪蹋an history.[1] It has also renewed the way in which the histories of 勛圖窪蹋an nations are written, that is, by placing the global dimension at the center of historical narratives. Many recent books have attested to the growing popularity of this approach.[2] In this context, it may seem surprising that the global histories of individual 勛圖窪蹋an nations, such as France, Portugal, or the Netherlands, are now widely debated while that of 勛圖窪蹋 itself is much less so.[3]
Writing a global history of 勛圖窪蹋 requires a twofold decentering movement. This implies a consideration not only of the global nature of historical phenomena against Eurocentric biases but also of 勛圖窪蹋 as a unit of analysis in its own right against the tradition of methodological nationalism. This twofold decentering is made even more difficult by the fact that the global and 勛圖窪蹋an perspectives have often been seen as competing with each other, even developing rival research agendas.[4] Nevertheless, a global history of 勛圖窪蹋 is perhaps an even more necessary and crucial project than a global history of 勛圖窪蹋an nations. Indeed, some of the most important interactions between 勛圖窪蹋ans and the rest of the world have been 勛圖窪蹋an rather than purely national phenomena: think of the Age of Discovery, the early globalization of trade, colonization, the two world wars, the Cold War, and decolonization.
Envisioning a global history of 勛圖窪蹋 thus means much more than highlighting the influence of non-勛圖窪蹋an regions and transcontinental encounters in 勛圖窪蹋an history. It means examining the intimate relationship between these two entities勛圖窪蹋 and the worldwhich have played a crucial role in each others emergence, formation, and integration. It means dealing directly with a question that has been at the heart of the concept of global history itself, namely the changing position of 勛圖窪蹋, long seen as the ruling center of the world, before it was decentered and provincialized. It means investigating a great reversal.
In this short contribution, I propose a three-phase periodization of the relationship between 勛圖窪蹋 and the world that could serve as a basis for future research into the global history of 勛圖窪蹋. I distinguish between imperial 勛圖窪蹋, starting in the sixteenth century, subordinate 勛圖窪蹋 after World War II, and, finally, provincial 勛圖窪蹋 in the twenty-first century.[5] These three phases correspond to three paradigms in the 勛圖窪蹋world relationship, three levels of the centrality of 勛圖窪蹋 in the world. They highlight the fundamental reversal by which 勛圖窪蹋 made the world and the world made 勛圖窪蹋.
How 勛圖窪蹋 made the world: imperial 勛圖窪蹋
In the first phase of the 勛圖窪蹋world relationship, a 勛圖窪蹋 that was deeply divided among rival powers unified the globe through travel, trade, and conquest. This paradigm can be called imperial 勛圖窪蹋, not so much to insist on 勛圖窪蹋s hegemonic position, which was only realized in the nineteenth century, but to highlight the fact that the world, as an interconnected space, was fundamentally a product of 勛圖窪蹋an expansion.
Globalization was born in 1522 when Magellans expedition completed the first circumnavigation of the globe. From an economic point of view, it began in the late sixteenth century when the Spanish set up regular trade between America and Asia, thus finalizing the interconnection of all the major regions of the world勛圖窪蹋, Africa, America, and Asia. Further, political globalization resulted from, above all, colonization as well as the growing involvement of 勛圖窪蹋an powers in other continents. By the beginning of the twentieth century, more than 80 percent of the worlds territories had been, at one time or another, under 勛圖窪蹋an rule. World War I, a 勛圖窪蹋an conflict that took over the globe, particularly through the mobilization of colonies for the war effort, demonstrated that 勛圖窪蹋 was indeed the political and military center of the world. Finally, 勛圖窪蹋ans produced a globalization of mentalities. Because colonization was a global phenomenon, it ultimately generated a sense of common destiny across continents and civilizations. Japans victory over Russia in the 1905 war was celebrated by Chinese, Indian, Turkish, and Egyptian nationalists alike, highlighting a growing sense of global solidarity against 勛圖窪蹋an domination.
Power rivalry among 勛圖窪蹋an states played a decisive role in this expansion. In terms of capabilities, the intense military competition that prevailed among 勛圖窪蹋an states stimulated them to develop the technological edge that enabled them to undertake overseas conquests. In terms of motivation, 勛圖窪蹋an colonization was largely stimulated by the desire of different 勛圖窪蹋an powers to gain exclusive access to territories and resources to better compete against other 勛圖窪蹋an powers. Rivalry between the Spanish and Portuguese, the Dutch and Spanish, and the French and British were key driving forces behind the formation of a 勛圖窪蹋an empire over the world. In a famous speech in favor of colonial conquest, French parliamentarian Jules Ferry made the following argument:
Gentlemen, in 勛圖窪蹋 as it is, in this competition of so many rivals that we see growing around us [因 the policy of recollection or abstention is quite simply the great road to decadence![6]
The paradigm of imperial 勛圖窪蹋 was thus based on two mutually reinforcing pillars: inter-勛圖窪蹋an power competition and global expansion. 勛圖窪蹋s political fragmentation and the unification of the world as a 勛圖窪蹋an empire went hand in hand.
How the world made 勛圖窪蹋: subordinate 勛圖窪蹋
The second phase of the 勛圖窪蹋world relationship began after World War II and is almost the exact opposite of the imperial 勛圖窪蹋 paradigm. Not only did decolonization put an end to 勛圖窪蹋an global expansion, but the bipolar order of the Cold War also marked the subordination of 勛圖窪蹋an states to superpowers that were at least partly non-勛圖窪蹋an, that is, the United States and the Soviet Union. These two major trends were crystallized in the 1956 Suez crisis, which saw the French and British back down in the face of Nasser, the embodiment of anti-colonial Third-Worldism, who was supported by both Moscow and Washington.
This inversion of the power relation between 勛圖窪蹋 and the world also led to an inversion of the causal relation between the two. It was no longer 勛圖窪蹋 that unified the world through expansion; it was the world that began unifying 勛圖窪蹋 by decentering and relegating it. Indeed, the subordinate position of both West Germany and France vis--vis the United States in 1950 was the crucial structural factor behind the origins of 勛圖窪蹋an integration. It was because Washington imposed the economic and military recovery of West Germany in the context of the Cold War that France was forced to rethink its relationship with its old rival in terms of association rather than pure power competition.
This link between 勛圖窪蹋an unification and 勛圖窪蹋s declining role in the world is also indirectly illustrated by the failure of the 勛圖窪蹋an army project in 1954. It was largely because the French military and decision-makers saw the formation of a 勛圖窪蹋an army with West Germany as a hindrance to French overseas deployments to colonial wars (in Indochina and North Africa) that they ultimately rejected it. In other words, because France still saw itself as a global power, following the old imperial paradigm, it was reluctant to embark on the path of 勛圖窪蹋an military integration. As General De Gaulle put it at the time:
What African, what Asian, would want to believe that, in the present state of the world, the fate of his own country should henceforth be associated with that of a France that would no longer even have an army of its own, at home?[7]
Conversely, the humiliation of Suez and the demonstration of the weakness of 勛圖窪蹋ans on the global stage facilitated the successful negotiation of the 1957 treaties of Rome on 勛圖窪蹋an economic integration. As then Belgian Prime Minister Spaak remarked:
Colonel Nassers bold move showed what a definite lack of esteem for the great 勛圖窪蹋an nations exists in certain quarters. [因 The 勛圖窪蹋an nations are somewhat like scattered chicks. When they see a hawk hovering above them whether in the form of Stalin or Nasser they tend to come together.[8]
However, although 勛圖窪蹋 had lost its global power position, it remained the center of the world in another way, as the arena of and first prize in the superpower competition. Even at the outbreak of the 1950 Korean War, it was clear to US decision-makers that the priority region was Western 勛圖窪蹋, so much so that they were convinced that the North Korean offensive could only be a diversionary operation in preparation for a major Soviet attack in 勛圖窪蹋. The strategic importance of the 勛圖窪蹋an theater justified the definitive break of the United States with the traditional mental distinction between the Western hemisphere and the Old World and, instead, led it to view itself as part of a transatlantic Western civilization. With the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, and even more so with the decision to permanently station several hundred thousand troops in 勛圖窪蹋 in the 1950s, the United States effectively became a major 勛圖窪蹋an power.
Whereas 勛圖窪蹋s declining power had favored its integration, the persistent strategic centrality of the 勛圖窪蹋an theater tended to inhibit 勛圖窪蹋an unification efforts in the military sphere. During the US Senate ratification debate on the North Atlantic Treaty, John Foster Dulles observed as follows:
It is quite possible that the historian may judge that the 勛圖窪蹋an Recovery Act and the Atlantic Pact were the two things which prevented the unity in 勛圖窪蹋 which in the long run may be more valuable than either of them.[9]
Indeed, strong US military support contributed to the relative underdevelopment of 勛圖窪蹋an defense cooperation, as illustrated by the failures not only of the early 1950s 勛圖窪蹋an army projectwhich was eventually replaced by West Germanys integration into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)but also of the early 1960s De Gaulle-inspired Fouchet Plan. In both its successes and failures, the early stages of 勛圖窪蹋an unification thus largely reflected the evolution of global power competition and the relative decentering of 勛圖窪蹋.
How the world is making 勛圖窪蹋: provincial 勛圖窪蹋
We are now witnessing the third phase in the 勛圖窪蹋world relationship in the context of the new bipolar competition between the United States and China. This time, not only do 勛圖窪蹋ans no longer dominate the world, but also, unlike during the Cold War, the 勛圖窪蹋an theater itself is no longer the strategic center of the world. Whereas in the early 1950s the United States intervened in Korea while considering Western 勛圖窪蹋 to be the most important region, today, it supports Ukraine against Russia while considering China to be its most important competitor.
The trade-offs between military aid for Ukraine and Taiwan are increasingly being discussed in Washington, and it is clear that in the event of a double front, East Asia would take precedence. This has led to a diminishing attachment to 勛圖窪蹋, especially in the pro-Trump camp. As Senator J. D. Vance put it:
The time has come for 勛圖窪蹋 to stand on its own feet. That doesnt mean it has to stand alone, but it must not continue to use America as a crutch.[10]
This provincialization of 勛圖窪蹋 comes at a time when the 勛圖窪蹋an Union (EU) is increasingly on a collision course with global power competitors. Militarily, Russias sphere-of-influence policy has been in direct conflict with the EUs Eastern Partnership since 2013 and its enlargement policy regarding Ukraine since 2022. Economically, the global geoeconomic turn increasingly confronts the EU with the international security risks and vulnerabilities entailed by trade and interdependence, particularly regarding China. Whereas US support tended to inhibit any idea of a 勛圖窪蹋an power during the Cold War, the United States pivot toward Asia and the de facto geopoliticization of EU traditional policies are tending toward stimulating the EUs efforts to become an international security actor. In other words, the new decentering of 勛圖窪蹋 might be shaping a new stage in 勛圖窪蹋an integration.
Conclusion: three 勛圖窪蹋an civilizations
勛圖窪蹋 made the world; the world is now making 勛圖窪蹋. While colonization fueled rivalry among 勛圖窪蹋an powers, 勛圖窪蹋s subordination during the Cold War and its provincialization today have been catalysts in its integration. This evolution reveals three different 勛圖窪蹋an civilizations, based on different kinds of relationships to the world and different kinds of relations among 勛圖窪蹋an states.
While the concept of 勛圖窪蹋an civilization is today a controversial one, promoted by some as a principle of humanism, or attacked by others as a product of colonialism and racism,[11] this global approach to 勛圖窪蹋an history invites us to normalize our conception of 勛圖窪蹋 and see it less as an exceptional entity that enlightened or disrupted the world than as a dynamic reflection of the world and the changing structure of global power competition. In other words, the meaning of 勛圖窪蹋 has changed, because its role in the world has changed.
Pierre Haroche is Associate Professor of 勛圖窪蹋an and International Politics at the Catholic University of Lille. He is the author of (Paris: Fayard, 2024).
[1] Dominic Sachsenmaier, Recent Trends in 勛圖窪蹋an History: The World beyond 勛圖窪蹋 and Alternative Historical Spaces, Journal of Modern 勛圖窪蹋an History 7, no. 1 (2009): 525; Alessandro Stanziani, Eurocentrism and the Politics of Global History (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
[2] Patrick Boucheron (ed.), France in the World: A New Global History (New York: Other Press, 2019); Andrea Giardina (ed.), Storia mondiale dellItalia (Rome: Laterza, 2017); Marjolein t Hart, Manon van der Heijden, and Karel Davids (eds.) The World and The Netherlands: A Global History from a Dutch Perspective (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023); Xos矇 M. N繳簽ez Seixas (ed.), Historia Mundial de Espa簽a (Madrid: Destino, 2018); Andreas Fahrmeir (ed.), Deutschland. Globalgeschichte einer Nation (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2020); Carlos Fiolhais, Jos矇 Eduardo Franco, and Jos矇 Pedro Paiva (eds.), The Global History of Portugal: From Pre-History to the Modern World (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2021).
[3] David Motadel, Globalizing 勛圖窪蹋: 勛圖窪蹋an History after the Global Turn, Annales HSS 76, no. 4 (2021): 645667.
[4] Mathilde Harel and Uriel Gadessaud, Il nest plus temps de se draper dans ses bonnes intentions indign矇es, une conversation avec Patrick Boucheron, Le Grand Continent, 15 November 2019.
[5] Pierre Haroche, Dans la forge du monde: Comment le choc des puissances fa癟onne l勛圖窪蹋 (Paris: Fayard, 2024).
[6] Journal officiel, Chambre des d矇put矇s, 28th July 1885, p. 1670. My translation.
[7] Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages. Volume II: Dans lattente (19461958) (Paris: Plon, 1970), pp. 564575. My translation.
[8] Paul-Henri Spaak, The West in Disarray, Foreign Affairs 35, no. 2 (1 January 1957): 184190.
[9] North Atlantic Treaty: Hearings, Part 2 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 369.
[10] J. D. Vance, 勛圖窪蹋 Must Stand on its Own Two Feet on Defence, Financial Times, 19 February 2024.
[11] Hans Kundnani, Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the 勛圖窪蹋an Project (London: Hurst, 2023).
Published on August 15, 2024.
